This will be a long post with lots of clips of information from the report... I found the report worth the read for the background information, 99% of this information the American public is ignorant of this background - our troops there are in for a long political trap and it is not their fault they are simply being used and abused.
If you are not intrested you may want to skip all the material in italics. (I do think it is worth the read and I would suggest going directly to the report.) I don't know how many times you will see "this was bad" but my impression of the report was that this was like they were in a bowl full of snakes.
Finishing the report I am even more convinced that Afghanistan is a mess, we should get out, it will only get worse, and the politicians have ulterior motives for our continued presence.
There were several times reading this I had the hair on my neck stand up.
Here is a link to the report - Battle of Wanat historical analysis
I don't think any of us thought the part about white hot barrel from the AP story was ever correct - it is an extension of using words to describe a stressful situation a hold over from the Vietnam style personal and journalistic embellishment - there have ben numerous studies about how humans do not make good eye-witness sources of information because of the tendency to fill-in information...
My reading of the report brings up some important items:
1. Focusing in on the fact that MSM whores (like AP) are not capable of getting a story 100% correct is not the real point (we know they do not, most of the time for propaganda).
2. This report is important, any concerned American willing to read and learn, should read this report (and others with additional information) to try to clearly understand the situation in the "Graveyard of Empires".
3. The situation the soldiers found themselves in was very bad. Things could have ended up much worse.
4. This group was not some bunch of FNG's this was a bunch of long-in-country hardened combat experienced soldiers. This was a group that would have maintained their rifles in the best condition possible and would have had lots of experience with "fire discipline" - they knew what they were doing and had done "it" under pressure for a long time.
5. While this report contains lot of important additional information about Afghanistan. I should tie it into the original subject of this thread. The current M4 rifle DOES have problems.
6. This particular situation has elements that would point out problems with any weapon system.
7. Because of the way the rifles were used generally, It does not look as if the reported "lack of power" in the 5.56 had much if any impact on this incidence.
8. There were far more examples of suppressive fire than direct lethal fire as this is the current tactic used by US forces, this clearly points to a need for a system capable of long term extended fire. One of the reasons sustained fire is often regulated to specially designed weapons.
9. Most of the air cooled belt-fed weapons have "quick-change" barrels that were designed to be changed every 200 to 300 rounds of fire. They could have used more than a few extra MGs each with a handful of extra barrels. Both the M-240 and the M-249 have a removable barrel, yet in the report it sounds as if they are not issued with spare barrels or they try not to use extra barrels - are they difficult to change or is that not the method of training? There was no mention of "hey soldier change that barrel" but rather "Hey soldier don't burn up that barrel" as if there is only one in use and available. Where were the extra barrels?
10. The situation the soldiers were placed in was almost medieval with attackers of high number moving in on a fixed position - again pointing to a need for a belt-fed with a quick change barrel in much higher numbers and in closer proximity to one another (a higher proportion distributed in the same groups).
11. Some of the malfunctions were due to explosions, shrapnel, and direct hits by aimed or inadvertent enemy small arms fire hitting the weapon and damaging operational parts or the frames, no weapon regardless of construction or design can withstand that damage.
I compare this situation to the the one the poor overrun soldiers in Mogadishu found themselves.
A rundown of Mogadishu here.
Of course none of this negates the fact that there are currently available modifications and weapons systems that would be better suited to the duty put to our servicemen in "the sand box" and that the price of replacement for the ENTIRE ARMY is LESS than what Halliburton ALONE has overcharged (read FRAUD) the military.
This is 1/10th to 1/20th of the money that has ended up "unaccounted or fraudulent" in Iraq ALONE and that was under a so-called "conservative" (read pathetic neo-con puppet)...
Now reviewing the report some things stick out - (report in italics) I have blanked more names than were blanked in the report, the report should stand on it's own.
Various authors and analysts have employed different terminology when referring to the insurgents in Afghanistan. The two most common terms are “Anti-Afghanistan Forces” (AAF) and “Anti-Coalition Militia” (ACM). ... the 10th Mountain Division more commonly utilized ACM. I have chosen to use “ACM” as I believe that it more properly describes the insurgents that are being encountered in Nuristan and Kunar Provinces. That is, the majority of the forces being encountered are more akin to militia, local fighters fighting within or near to their communities, rather than being what Western militaries might consider to be organized “forces.” Additionally, these insurgents perceive themselves as fighting for a better future for Afghanistan, one that is fundamentally Islamic, has local government, and is free of international or western influence. They are, more accurately, anti-coalition in that they are opposed to the Afghan central, western-influenced, elected government of President Karzai. Thus, the term “ACM” is more technically accurate than anti-Afghanistan (they simply have a radically different view of what they consider to be pro or anti-Afghanistan).
Can we draw any parallels? Say Vietnam?
These villages were set in locations which were inaccessible and surrounded by vast tracts of rugged lands not traversed by trails, paths or routes. These tracts could only be exploited by well-armed herders who could take their animals there under protection, and they served as effective buffer zones for their communities.
Armed locals who are expected to be armed and comfortable with the arms in a hostile rugged environment...
The most well known American incursion into Kunar Province was Operation Red Wing, when a U.S. Navy SEAL Team was inserted against Ahmad Shah, a Taliban HVT to the east of the Korengal Valley and south of the Pech River in June 2005. The SEAL Team was compromised by a chance encounter with Afghan goat herders, and following a heavy firefight was defeated by a large force of insurgents. A Special Operations helicopter, hurrying to the relief of the SEAL Team, was shot down by an RPG and sixteen soldiers were killed. Ahmad Shah would subsequently be slain by the 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division in 2006. Of the SEAL Team, only Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class (SEAL) [blank] survived.
What can I say? That is interesting, note the helicopter and RPG just as in Mogadishu.
I like Wanat quite a bit. The people were always good to us. They always gave us tips when trouble was coming. I felt very confident moving about without my armor on, ...The key thing was the relationship that LT [blank] and his engineers had established there when they were building the bridge. [blank] was great with the people, and they took him in like a brother. This made the place pretty safe, comparatively speaking. - Battalion Commander
The interaction with some of the military and the locals is worth the read particularly the engineers.
There was considerable ACM presence in the Waigal Valley, including politically oriented formations such as various former Mujahideen entities
Remember that name? Mujahideen freedom fighters ring a bell?
The 10th Mountain Division in the campaign season before had initiated “Operation Mountain Lamb” specifically focused upon the distribution of humanitarian supplies to the population of northeast Afghanistan.xliv Neither TF Rock nor TF Bayonet ever established such a program.
To the people of the Waigal Valley whose homes were being leveled, and whose neighborhoods and farm fields were being turned into battlefields, they saw no commensurate improvement in their lives, and no real evidence of security being provided by the coalition. As demonstrated in Wanat in the fall of 2006, when security was provided, interaction between the soldiers and the population was permitted, and when the community derived economic benefits (such as being paid for labor, selling bread and food, and receiving two modern bridges) from the coalition’s presence, the community responded with strong pro-central Afghanistan government and American feelings, and reciprocated with support and intelligence. However, a lack of services by the Afghan government, coupled with lack of security being enabled by the American military presence, and alienation caused by the aggressive kinetic fight being carried to the insurgents by TF Rock, swiftly degraded the relationships between the population of the Waigal Valley and the coalition. The population, facing legitimate threats and dangers from the virulent insurgents, could not tolerate being perceived as being supportive of the coalition unless they were being adequately protected by the American paratroopers and ANA/ANP. Without security, or improvements to their quality of life that were worth risking their lives for, the residents of the Waigal Valley remained (at best) uncommitted. Numerous American soldiers have interpreted this as: “The population is also very xenophobic and are largely fence sitters.” Lieutenant Colonel [blank], assessed that: “Waygul history is replete with deception, dishonesty, two-faced tactics, actions counter to Afghan culture and Islam.” However, both of these assessments can be construed as being exclusively American in interpretation, rather than incorporating the Waigal Valley population’s situation and concerns.
...
Influencing this perception is the extremely deleterious effects of destroying even a single residence in the comparatively small villages of the Waigal Valley, which are very tight-knit and inter-related through the extended families that inhabit the region, and are also desperately poor. To the residents of these communities, they hold the Americans who dropped the bomb to be equally as culpable as the insurgents who attracted the bomb in the first place. One senior American analyst with exhaustive experience of Pakistan and Afghanistan has concluded: “…the indiscriminate use of airpower in inhabited areas has been extremely damaging to counterinsurgency efforts among a revenge-oriented people with a zero tolerance for insult and collateral damage.” The highly kinetic approach favored by TF Rock, in contravention of the earlier population centric approach taken by TF Chosen, rapidly and inevitably degraded the relationships between the U.S. Army and the Waigal Valley population.
The stick and carrot in action.
Then an event happened - the details on the linked page, that could be called the straw on the camel.
This attack, whether justified or not by U.S. forces, aggravated public opinion throughout the Waigal Valley against the Americans, and caused much of the population to (for at least the time being) actively support the ACM. Sami Nurstani, a Waigal Valley resident, analyzed the incident:
I think July 4 was a disaster both for the people of Waygal valley and the Coalition forces. The aftermath of the Bella incident led to the Wantt attack, the link is very obvious mostly caused by the anger over the death of innocent civilian in Bella. I have known two of the deceased in that incident. Most people believe that the locals were so angered by the Bella incident that they even cooperated (or simply did not report to the Americans) with those who attacked the Wantt outpost. The attack certainly changed people’s support for the US army given the fact that they killed the very people who had helped them or were very cooperative to them.
The result...
Chosen Company and TF Rock had spent over fourteen months in intensive, unremitting combat in the Waigal. By this time, the soldiers of Chosen Company and TF Rock were more than familiar with the ACM that they contested against. They knew how the insurgents fought, they understood their tactics and how they preferred to employ their weapons, and they respected the ACM as tough, determined, committed and skilled fighters. However, as noted, actual interactions between the population and the paratroopers had been extremely limited, and as a result the population and Chosen soldiers were virtual strangers. Generally, Chosen Company’s time in the Waigal Valley had proven to be frustrating, and although considerable efforts had been expended, little real progress was visible. As LTC Ostlund believed, and most of his Chosen Few soldiers would have concurred with him, “Waygul history is replete with deception, dishonesty, two-faced tactics, actions counter to Afghan culture and Islam. [The] Population provides no information to GoA [Government of Afghanistan] and provides support to AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces].” One young, but highly experienced, Chosen Company soldier echoed LTC [blank] impressions:
Those people, they disgust me. We built them a school and gave them money for roads. A lot of times, I gave the workers clothes for their kids and shoes for their kids. I gave them blankets. We’d give them food and they complained that we didn’t do enough for them. Those people live a different life than the rest of the Afghanis. They have no morals whatsoever. They would kill their own son if you gave them a goat. Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They’re worthless.
Against this background of mutual distrust and nearly fifteen months of acrimonious interaction, the withdrawal from COP Bella and the occupation of COP Kahler in Wanat moved forward.
See above about personal viewpoints, much of this sounds eerily like Vietnam in more than a few ways.
With a large insurgent force actively operating in the Waigal Valley and available for immediate employment, and the local populace ill disposed to the coalition as a fall-out from the earlier helicopter attack, it was unlikely that the ACM would let this fleeting opportunity slip away without taking action.
Under close observation with possible willing or coerced insiders.
The great amount of firepower employed for two hours suggests that there was considerable local fighter support, simply to transport and supply the staggering quantities of ordnance expended, and evacuate the considerable number of casualties successfully from the battlefield. This was a large, and extremely skilled and dedicated, fighting force.
This was bad, very bad, not just a handful of people but a large coordinated attack.
First, beginning the night of July 11th-12th, the ITAS and LRAS sensors at Wanat began to acquire small groups of individuals moving across the mountain slopes around COP Kahler, and then vanishing into the many precipitous draws and ravines of the countryside. With one exception, they could not be positively identified (PID) as insurgents. However, the sudden appearance of numerous small groups of individuals should have been a matter of concern.
The dark clouds and ill wind before the storm...
Most of these reports were apparently not judged to be of significant import... He was demanding the support we weren’t getting, but we weren’t the priority anymore because it wasn’t flashy... “We had no support from brigade, division or theater level assets at the time.”...previous experience in the year before was that once an outpost was established it was rapidly attacked.
Review the construction and limitations with the HESCO Barriers, they had even ran out of fuel for the earth mover because they could not pump it out of storage!
There were repeated and recurring failures of small arms firing at “cyclic” rates of fire (high volume of fire for extended duration) during this engagement. Weapon systems that experienced failures include M-4 rifles, SAW automatic weapons, and MK19 grenade launchers. The failure of weapons at OP Topside degraded the defense of that post at a critical moment in the engagement, and contributed to the penetration of that position by the ACM. Some GWOT and U.S. Army veterans queried by the author have suggested that this could have been caused by improper weapon cleaning. However, numerous Chosen Few NCOs interviewed for this study have been vehemently adamant in stating that weapons were meticulously and regularly cleaned, and rigorously and routinely inspected by the chain of command. Other GWOT veterans consulted have noted that the high rates of fire sustained during the two hour intense engagement phase at Wanat could possibly have contributed to these failures. However, numerous weapons failed relatively early in the engagement (particularly a number of M-4 rifles and at one SAW at the mortar pit), and in any event the maintenance of cyclic rates of fire was critical to restore fire superiority, and to prevent positions (particularly at OP Topside) from being overrun by determined, numerous, and hard pressed insurgent assaults. The U.S. Army Project Manager-Soldier Weapons needs to investigate the reason(s) behind the repeated failures of multiple weapons at sustained cyclic rates of fire, and initiate appropriate measures to address such failures.
I think this supports the theory that the systems need upgrading.
The platoon sized element that occupied Wanat possessed barely sufficient firepower to defend itself (as the events of July 13th decisively validated); and lacked adequate firepower to extend their sphere of influence even from the COP into the adjoining community.
Speaks for itself.
“Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power! Any defect of action and effort will turn to the advantage of the enemy, and it will not be easy to change from a fencer’s position to that of a wrestler. A slight blow may then often be enough to cause a total collapse.” - General Carl Von Clausewitz
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